Hofstra Property Law Journal
Volume 1 | Issue 1

Article 11

3-1-1988

Money for the Taking: When Land Use Regulation
Goes Too Far
Daniel J. Curtin Jr.
Michael Durkee

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hplj
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
Recommended Citation
Curtin Jr., Daniel J. and Durkee, Michael (1988) "Money for the Taking: When Land Use Regulation Goes Too Far," Hofstra Property
Law Journal: Vol. 1 : Iss. 1 , Article 11.
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hplj/vol1/iss1/11

This A Practitioner's Symposium on the Recent Supreme Court Taking Cases is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at
Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Property Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For
more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

MONEY FOR THE TAKING: WHEN LAND
USE REGULATION GOES TOO FAR
Daniel J. Curtin Jr.*
Michael P. Durkee**
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION .................................

A.

B.

III. THE

IV.

..........................
Taking? ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

THE LAW OF TAKINGS

110
111

W hat Is A
111
1. Constitutional provision ..................
111
2. Judicial standards .......................
112
a. Early efforts .......................
112
b. Agins' two-part test .................
113
c. Property rights and vested rights ......
117
Remedies For Excessive Land Use Regulations . 118
1. Remedies for "Takings" under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments ..................
118
a.
D am ages ..........................
118
b. Invalidation ........................
119
2. Other rem edies ....
....................
119
THREE NEW CASES:

Keystone Coal, First Lu-

theran Church AND Nollan ......................
A . Introduction ...............................
B. First Lutheran Church - Money For the Taking
C. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission - The
Nexus Requirement .........................
D. Keystone Coal - Pennsylvania Coal Revisited...

120
120
121

IMPACTS OF THE NEW CASES ON LAND USE PLANNING

128

123
127

' Of Counsel at McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen; J.D. 1957, University of San
Francisco School of Law; A.B. 1954, University of San Francisco.
** Associate at McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen; J.D. 1984, McGeorge School of
Law of the University of Pacific; A.B. 1981, University of California at Davis.
Editorial assistance provided by Karen D. Rails, Legal Assistant, McCutchen, Doyle,
Brown & Enersen.

HOFSTRA PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL

A.

B.

C.

V.

[Vol. 1:i09

G eneral Im pacts ...........................
1. C hilling effect ..........................
2. Trend in the law of takings ..............
3. Applicability to initiatives and referenda ...
4. Retroactivity ...........................
Specific Impacts and Questions ...............
1. Temporary takings ......................
a. Delays ............................
b. Interim ordinances, moratoria and other
growth control measures .............
c.
Measurement issues .................
2. Effects of the "nexus" requirement on specific
land use tools ..........................
Impacts On Development And Litigation Strateg ies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Development strategies ...................
2. Litigation strategies .....................

CONCLUSION

...................................
I.

128
128
129
129
130
130
130
130
132
132
135
13 6
136
136
136

INTRODUCTION

Cities' have the power to regulate the use of private property,
pursuant to their inherent police powers, to prevent public harm and
to achieve public benefits.' In exceptional cases, cities can even be
3
entitled to destroy or prohibit the use of private property.
However, a city's ability to enact land-use regulations under its
police power is limited by the takings clause of the fifth amendment
of the United States Constitution, as made applicable to the states
by the fourteenth amendment. The takings clause protects private
property rights against governmental action by providing that private property shall not be appropriated (taken) by the government
for public use without compensating the owner of the property. Private property need not be physically seized to constitute a taking;
regulation of property, such as land-use regulation, can constitute a
taking if it is determined to be excessive. As Justice Oliver Wendell
1. When the words "city" or "cities" are used herein, they also mean "county" or
"counties"; similarly, "city council" also means "board of supervisors."
2. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
3. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623
(1887).
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Holmes wrote sixty-five years ago in an opinion of the United States
Supreme Court, "[t]he general rule

. . .

is, that while property may

be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking."4
Justice Holmes said that "the question at bottom is on whom
the loss of the changes desired should fall," and he warned "[wie are
in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." 5
The fifth amendment's guarantee is "designed -to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 6
While it is easy to say that a regulation can "go too far" and
constitute a taking for which the fifth amendment commands just
compensation, or to talk in terms of "justice and fairness," it is not
so easy to propose any standard which, in any given case, would determine whether a regulation has gone "too far." Holmes himself
admitted the necessary generality of his approach: "[Tihis is a question of degree - and therefore cannot be disposed of by general
''
propositions. 7
II. THE
A.

LAW OF TAKINGS

What Is A Taking?

1. Constitutional provision.
"... nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The most important thing to note about the fifth amendment's
"takings" clause is that the fifth amendment does not prohibit takings - it prohibits takings without "just compensation." If the government wants to take private property for public use, it can, but it
must pay "just compensation" for the property. However, the fifth
amendment itself is not of help in determining what constitutes a
taking nor in determining what compensation would be "just."
4.
5.
6.
7.

Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania
Armstrong v.
Pennsylvania

Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
Coal, 260 U.S. at 416.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
Coal, 260 U.S. at 416.
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2. Judicial standards.
a. Early efforts.
The courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have
had a difficult time determining when a regulatory governmental action such as a land-use regulation amounts to a taking for which the
fifth amendment requires the payment of just compensation. In
Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes told us that a land-use regulation
could go "too far" and constitute a taking, but he did not tell us how
far was too far. The Supreme Court has candidly admitted that it
has never been able to develop a " 'set formula' to determine when
'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public
action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons." 8 Instead, the Court
has observed that "whether a particular restriction will be rendered
invalid by the government's failure to pay for any losses proximately
caused by it depends largely 'upon the particular circumstances [in
that] case.' " The question of whether a regulation has gone too far
and a taking has occurred has been an ad hoc, factual inquiry. 10
In Penn Central, the Court considered the constitutionality of
New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law as it had been applied to the Grand Central Terminal of Penn Central Transportation
Company. The Landmarks Preservation Law prohibited the destruction or substantial alteration of buildings, such as the Grand Central
Terminal, which were designated as landmarks. When New York
City's Landmarks Preservation Commission rejected Penn Central's
plan to build a 50-story office building above the Terminal as being
destructive of the Terminal's historic and aesthetic features, Penn
Central brought suit in state court alleging that the application of
the Landmarks Law had taken its property without just compensation in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
In a 6-to-3 decision that included the current Chief Justice in
the minority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling
that the application of the Landmarks Law did not effect a "taking,"
holding that "[tlhe restrictions imposed are substantially related to
the general welfare and not only permit reasonable beneficial use of
the landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities further to
8. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
9. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
10. Id.
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enhance not only the Terminal site proper but also other properties. 1
The Court did not establish a test for determining when a taking has occurred; in fact it admitted that takings analysis proceeds
on an essentially "ad hoc" basis. The Court did, however, identify
"several factors" that have particular significance.
The first factor identified by the Court is the "economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant" and, in particular, "the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed

expectations. "12
The second factor is the "character of the governmental action." "A 'taking' may more readily be found when the interference
with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government [citation omitted] than when the interference arises through a
public program's adjustment of the benefits and burdens of economic
life to promote the common good."' 3 This is the distinction drawn
between "physical invasion" and "regulatory" takings.
The Court also noted in the opinion that "government actions
that may be characterized as acquisitions of resources to permit or
facilitate uniquely public functions have often been held to constitute
'takings.' "1"
b.

The Agins'-two-part test.

In Agins v. City of Tiburon," the Court was more specific in its
articulation of the proper test for a taking. In two important takings
decisions by the United States Supreme Court this term 6 , Agins appears to remain the test for a taking. In the Agins dispute, the City
of Tiburon adopted ordinances modifying existing zoning ordinances
(which allowed five units to be built without further land use approval) and placed Agins' property in a more restrictive Residential
Planned Development and Open Space Zone. The modified zoning
permitted single family dwellings, accessory buildings and open
space uses. Density restrictions would have permitted the Agins to
build, with city approval, between one and five single family residences on their 5-acre tract, but the Agins never sought approval for
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
Nollan v.

Penn Central, Id. at 138.
Id. at 124.
Id at 124.
Id. at 128.
447 U.S. 255 (1979).
(Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. De Benedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987) and
California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987)).
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development of their land under the zoning ordinance, deciding instead to file suit in state court alleging a taking of their property,
contending that the city had "completely destroyed the value of
[Agins'] property for any purpose or use whatsoever ..
."I'
". The
United States Supreme Court, affirming the decision of the California Supreme Court, held that the ordinances did not constitute a
taking. The Court stated that the application of a general zoning law
to a particular property becomes a taking if the ordinance either (1)
"does not substantially advance legitimate state interests" or (2)
"denies an owner economically viable use of his land." 1 8 The Agins
Court held that the City of Tiburon's open space ordinances substantially advanced a legitimate governmental goal, that of discouraging
premature and unnecessary conversion of open-space land to urban
uses and -was a proper exercise of the City's police power to protect
its residents from the effects of urbanization. 9
(1)

The regulation must substantially advance a legitimate state
interest.

In Keystone Coal, the Court acknowledged that the two Agins
tests "have become integral parts of our takings analysis. 2 0° The
Court, however, citing numerous precedents and several other "factors" important to the takings analysis, left an additional gloss to the
first part of the test. It appears that even among those regulations
which "substantially advance" a "legitimate state interest," some
state interests are more "legitimate" than others, i.e., the more defensible the state's interest is in regulating property, the more likely
the regulation will be upheld. The Court cited Pennsylvania Coal as
recognizing that "the nature of the State's interest in the regulation
is a critical factor in determining whether a taking has occurred, and
thus whether compensation is required." '
The Court also noted another important factor:
[T]he type of taking alleged is also often a critical factor. It is well
settled that a "taking" may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion
by the government [citation omitted] than when interference arises
from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Agins, 447 U.S. at 258.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 261-62.
Keystone Coal, 107 S. Ct. at 1242.
Id. at 1243.
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economic life to promote the common good."'

The Court in the Nollan case, discussed below, also added some
gloss to the first part of the test. In considering the constitutionality
of a California Coastal Commission development permit condition
requiring dedication of a lateral access easement along the Nollans'
private beach, the Court reiterated the two-part test, finding that the
lack of "nexus" between the burdens imposed by the Nollans' development and the condition caused the dedication requirement to fail
the first part of the test, i.e., the dedication did not "substantially
advance" a "legitimate state interest." Justice Scalia admitted that
the Court had not been specific about what was needed to pass the
first part of the test, but he noted that a wide variety of land-use
tools had passed:
Our cases have not elaborated on the standards for determining
what constitutes a 'legitimate state interest' or what type of connection between the regulation and the state interest satisfies the
requirement that the former 'substantially advance' the latter.
They have made clear, however, that a broad range of governmental purposes and regulations satisfies these requirements. See Agins
v. Tiburon, supra at 260-262 (scenic zoning); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, supra (landmark preservation);
[Village of] Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(residential zoning).

s

The Nollan decision did not address the second part of the takings test; it merely embellished the first part of the test by adding a
focus on "nexus." Many questions remain, both about the old standard and the new embellishment. (E.g., What is a legitimate state
interest? When does the "nexus" analysis apply? How close must
the nexus be?) These questions are taken up below.
(2) An owner may not be denied economically viable use of his
land.
Governmental regulations, by their very nature, have an impact
on property values. Mere fluctuations in value are "incidents of ownership" and "cannot be considered a 'taking' in a constitutional
sense."" The United States Supreme Court has continually "recognized, in a wide variety of contexts, that government may execute
22. Id. at 1244.
23. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146.
24. Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939).
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laws or programs that adversely affect recognized economic values." 2 5 In appropriate cases, the Court "has upheld land-use regulations that destroyed or adversely affected recognized real property
interests." 26 Writing for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal, Justice
Holmes explained:
Government could hardly go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, or
the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution.
When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases
there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
sustain the act. So the question depends on the particular facts.""
In Penn Central the Court noted that prior cases which have
sustained land-use regulations which were reasonably related to the
promotion of the general welfare:
uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in property value,
standing alone, can establish a "taking," see Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, [47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303]
(1926) (75% diminution in value caused by zoning law);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, [36 S.Ct. 143, 60 L. Ed.
348] (1915) (87- % diminution in value); cf. City of Eastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. at 674 n.8, [96 S. Ct. at
2362 n.8,] and that the "taking" issue in these contexts is resolved
by focusing on the uses the regulations permit. See also Goldblatt
v. Hempstead, supra. [369 U.S. 590, 82 S.Ct. 987, 8 L. Ed. 130
(1962)] [sic]2"
. In Keystone Coal, the Court in determining whether the owners
had been deprived of "economically viable use" looked to the value
that was left in the owner's property, not the value that was taken.
The plaintiffs and appellants in the case were an association of coal
mine owners in Pennsylvania who brought suit alleging that the
Pennsylvania Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation
Act (the "Subsidence Act") constituted a taking of their property.
Although the association alleged that the Subsidence Act re25.
26.
27.
28.

Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
Id. at 125.
Pennsylvania Coal, at 413.
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131.
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quired them to forego mining almost 27 million tons of coal in their
mines, the Court instead focused on the fact that the total coal in the
13 mines operated by the companies amounted to over 1.46 billion
tons. Noting that the Subsidence Act affected less than 2 percent of
the owners' coal, the Court said that the owners "have not shown
any deprivation significant enough to satisfy the heavy burden placed
upon one alleging a regulatory taking. '2 9 "[T]here is no showing
that petitioners' reasonable 'investment-backed expectations' have
been materially affected . . .,,"
c.

Property rights and vested rights.

One reason why land-use regulations can withstand constitutional scrutiny, even when the value of the owners' property is substantially decreased, is the United States Supreme Court's repeated
determination that the property rights protected by the takings
clause of the fifth amendment are those property rights created by
state law.3 1 California courts, interpreting California state property
law, have indicated there is no right to develop. "Development is a
32
privilege, not a right.
A developer can acquire a "vested right" to develop under certain circumstances. First, under the common law rule, a developer
can acquire a vested right to build out a project if a building permit
has been obtained and substantial work has been done and substantial liabilities have been incurred in good faith reliance upon the
permit.
The current common law vested rights rule in California was
established by the case of Avco Community Developers, Inc. v.
South Coast Regional Commission," The Court stated:
It has long been the rule in this state and in other jurisdictions that
if a property owner has performed substantial work and incurred
substantial liabilities in good faith reliance upon a permit issued by
the government, he acquires a vested right to complete construction
in accordance with the terms of the permit. [citations omitted]
Once a landowner has secured a vested right the government may
not, by virtue of a change in the zoning laws, prohibit construction
29. Keystone Coal, 107 S. Ct. at 1246.
30. Id. at 1249.
31. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,
Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980).
32. Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal App. 3d 317, 328, 107 Cal. Rptr.
685 (1981).
33. 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976).
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authorized by the permit upon which he relied.

4

The Avco court stated further "neither the existence of a particular zoning nor work undertaken pursuant to governmental approvals preparatory to construction of buildings can form the basis of a
vested right to build a structure which does not comply with the laws
applicable at the time the building permit is issued." 5
The California Legislature has provided two other ways a developer can obtain a vested right to develop: by entering into a development agreement with the city (pursuant to CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 65866 (West 1983)) or by filing a vesting tentative map (pursuant
to CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66498.1 (West 1987)).

Thus it follows from these California authorities that an owner's
state-law-defined property rights - those rights which are protected
from being taken for public use without just compensation - are
severely limited by the "vested rights" doctrine. Until a property

owner acquires a vested right to proceed with its project, the owner
runs the risk that land-use regulations will change in a way which
will substantially decrease the value of its property. This decrease in
value is limited only by the second part of the takings test - that
the owner not be denied "economically viable" use of its property and the United States Supreme Court has interpreted that standard
so as to uphold land-use regulations which have caused extreme reductions in property values. The Court has said that diminution in
property value, standing alone, will not constitute a taking. The
Court will look at what uses are left for the owner's property and
will not look in isolation at injuries to specific parts of an owner's
property or be swayed by the magnitude, in dollars, of the owner's
loss.
B.

Remedies For Excessive Land Use Regulation.

1. Remedies for "Takings" under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments.
a. Damages.
Before the First Lutheran Church decision was handed down
this June, the California rule was that monetary damages were not
available as a remedy for a regulatory taking. As will be discussed in
detail below, the First Lutheran Church decision reversed the Cali34.
35.

Avco, 17 Cal. 3d at 791, 553 P.2d at 550, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 389-390.
Avco, 17 Cal. 3d at 793, 553 P.2d at 551, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
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fornia rule, finding that damages are constitutionally-required for
the taking of private property, even if the taking is only "temporary"
because the offending regulation is subsequently rescinded.
Some commentators view the availability of damages as "a new
weapon for developers," but others would argue that the decision is
only the fair and natural result of a literal reading of the fifth
amendment and will only apply in those rare cases where regulation
goes so far as to constitute a taking. Both sides should agree that the
First Lutheran Church decision does nothing to increase the likelihood that a regulation will be found to constitute a taking. Many
questions remain as to how the remedy will be applied by the courts.
b.

Invalidation.

Before First Lutheran Church, invalidation of the offending regulation was the only remedy available in California for a regulatory
taking. Invalidation is still the only remedy for the prospective application of the unlawful regulation - the landowner cannot force the
city to permanently acquire the property through eminent domain.
When faced with the finding that one of its regulations constitutes a
taking, a city has the choice of abandoning the offending regulation,
or it may keep the regulation in place and pay for the property so
taken.
2.

Other remedies.

An aggrieved landowner is not limited to the remedies flowing
from the takings clause of the fifth amendment. The landowner can
make claims under the due process clause for unfair or illegally motivated governmental decision making. This approach has not been
very successful unless an illegal motive can be shown. The landowner
can also claim that a regulation which impacts his or her property in
an apparently discriminatory manner is a violation of his or her
rights to equal protection under the law. In California, the courts
have not been very receptive to this challenge. 6 Actions pursuant to
§ 1983 are not procedurally limited by the burden of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as are "takings" claims.
36. See Candid Enter. v. Grossmont Union High School Dist., 39 Cal. 3d 878, 890, 705
P.2d 876, 218 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1985), wherein the California Supreme Court stated that "developers do not constitute a 'suspect class' and development is not a 'fundamental interest;'"
therefore, the equal protection argument was not available. Claims for damages for both violations can be made under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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THE THREE NEW CASES: Keystone Coal,
Church AND Nollan
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First Lutheran

Introduction

During the United States Supreme Court's 1986-1987 term, the
Court issued three decisions on the law of takings which are of great
importance to landowners, developers, planners, local legislators
in fact, everyone involved in the land-use regulation process.
The first case, the Keystone Coal case described above, received
little fanfare in comparison with the other two cases, but it was important for several reasons. First, it reaffirmed, in practically the
same judicial breath as the other two cases, the Court's standards
for determining how far regulation can go before it constitutes a taking. It may serve as a rudder to keep the law of takings from veering
too far off course from the impact of the other two cases. Also, the
Court in Keystone Coal rejected a challenge that the Subsidence Act
was unconstitutional on its face, even though the state statute and
the facts of the case were quite similar to those of the landmark
Pennsylvania Coal case. The reason for the difference in outcome
probably is not so much because of differences in the facts or the
statutes, but more because of a shift in societal values in the last 65
years and because the Subsidence Act was established with a better
administrative record citing the public health, safety and welfare
concerns involved.
The other two takings cases - First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 7 and Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission,3 8 - were the ones which made the headlines.
Both decisions increased the protection of private property rights
against excessive governmental regulation. However, neither case
gave any better definition of how far is "too far."
In the first case, First Lutheran Church, the Court held that
monetary damages are available for regulatory takings, overturning
the California rule. In the second case, Nollan, the Court invalidated
a condition imposed by the California Coastal Commission on a development permit because of a lack of "nexus," i.e., the condition
was not reasonably related to the public need or burden the development created (or to which it contributed). Both decisions are generally considered victories for California property owners, whose rights
previously have received less protection from the California courts.
37.
38.

107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
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B.

First Lutheran Church -

Money for the Taking.

In First Lutheran Church, the United States Supreme Court,
reversing the California rule, held that the "just compensation
clause" of the fifth amendment, as applied to the States under the
fourteenth amendment, mandates that a landowner may recover
damages if the land use restriction constitutes a "taking" of his
property.
Prior to First Lutheran Church, California courts had held that
a landowner who had been denied all beneficial use of his property
through unreasonable governmental regulation was not entitled to a
damages award and could only seek a court order invalidating the
regulation. 9 In overturning the California rule, the Court held that
the Constitution requires compensation for any "temporary taking"
that may occur while the regulation is in effect prior to the Court's
taking determination.
The facts of the case are somewhat unlikely for such a
landmark taking decision. In 1957, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church purchased a 21-acre parcel of land in a canyon along
the banks of the Middle Fork of Mill Creek in the Angeles National
Forest. The Middle Fork is the natural drainage channel for a watershed area owned by the United States Forest Service. The church
operated a campground on the site, known as "Lutherglen," as a
retreat center and a recreational area for handicapped children.
In July of 1977, a forest fire destroyed 3,860 acres of mountainous forest upstream from Lutherglen, creating a serious flood hazard. In February of 1978, in a flash flood that killed 10 people, the
buildings on Lutherglen were destroyed.
In response to the flooding of the canyon, the County of Los
Angeles adopted Interim Ordinance No. 11,855. The ordinance declared the area a flood zone and prohibited First Lutheran Church
from rebuilding. The church sued, challenging the county's prohibition as a taking, and sought money damages. The trial court dismissed the claim, relying on Agins and finding that invalidation, and
not money damages, was the only available remedy. The state court
of appeal upheld this decision and the case was taken to the United
States Supreme Court after the California Supreme Court had dismissed the claim on the damages issue alone.
The United States Supreme Court, addressing only the issue of
39. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, aff'd on
other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1979).
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the availability of money damages, reversed the judgment of the
California Court of Appeals. The Court held that invalidation of the
ordinance, without payment of money damages for the use of the
property during the period of time the appellant was denied all use
of its property, would be a constitutionally insufficient remedy. The
case was remanded to the trial court on the question of whether such
a flood control ordinance actually amounted to a taking of property.
In holding that the remedy of money damages should be available in the case of a regulatory taking, the Court finally reached a
decision it had been putting off for several years. " It is important to
note that the Court only decided that damages were an available
remedy if a taking is found; it did not address the more difficult
question of whether Los angeles County's flood control regulation
would constitute a taking (Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent,
felt that the regulation clearly would not constitute a taking.) Instead, because of the nature of the appeal, the Court proceeded on
the assumption that a taking had occurred, and the Court reasoned
that the fifth amendment required just compensation for all takings,
whether temporary or permanent.
The Court found that the Agins decision improperly held that
the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment does not require
compensation as a remedy for "temporary" regulatory takings, stating that the Agins decision "has truncated the rule by disallowing
damages that occurred prior to the ultimate invalidation of the chal' Citing a line of World War II cases where the
lenged regulation."41
Government had temporarily exercised its right to use private property and compensation was required, the Court concluded that "temporary" takings were not different from permanent takings, for
which the Constitution clearly requires compensation.4 "" Finding
that the doctrine of inverse condemnation is predicated on the proposition that a taking may occur without formal governmental condemnation proceedings, the Court held that the government must
award just compensation in such situations, as well as in the typical
taking situation where the government actually condemns the property in eminent domain.
The Court limited its holding, however, to instances where the
40. See, e.g., San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621
(1981); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
41. First Lutheran Church, 107 S. Ct. at 2387.
41.1 Id. at 2388.
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landowner was denied all use of its property. Further, the Court expressly did not deal with the "quite different" questions that would
arise in the case of normal delays in obtaining building permits,
changes in zoning ordinances and variances.
The decision leaves many important questions unanswered, not
the least of which is whether the county's interim ordinance constituted a taking. The Court stated that "the county might avoid the
conclusion that a compensable taking had occurred by establishing
that the denial of all use was insulated as a part of the State's authority to enact safety regulations." 4 That question will be discussed
on remand to the California courts.
The Court also gave little guidance on other important questions such as to how the damages should be measured, when such a
temporary taking period commences and what impact a plaintiff's
burden of exhausting its administrative remedies will have on that
period (a point the dissent stresses). These issues will have to be resolved in future litigation.
The First Lutheran Church case raises serious questions about
the advisability of certain moratoria, interim ordinances and growth
control ordinances which are not based on health or safety reasons.
Because First Lutheran Church allows damages for "temporary takings," cities with regulations precluding all development of property
while studies are conducted or safety concerns alleviated might run
the risk of liability for monetary damages.
C. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission Requirement.

the Nexus

In a decision long-awaited by property owners, builders, planners and government officials, the United States Supreme Court
ruled that a beach access dedication requirement imposed by the
California Coastal Commission as a condition to its approval to construct a beach house was an unconstitutional "taking" of private
property without just compensation."' The decision has implications
far beyond the issue of coastal access - virtually all conditions imposed by government in connection with permitting development
must now be considered carefully in light of its holdings. But Nollan,
like the First Lutheran Church decision, leaves many unanswered
questions.
42.
43.

Id. at 2384-85.
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
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The facts of the dispute are as follows. In 1982, James and
Marilyn Nollan sought a permit from the Coastal Commission to
demolish their existing single story beachfront house and replace it
with a two story, three bedroom house approximately 3 times larger
than the existing structure. Public beaches are located within onehalf mile to the north and south of the Nollans' property. Finding
that the new house would increase blockage of the ocean view, increase private use of the shorefront and set up a "psychological barrier" by preventing the public from realizing the existence of the
public beaches nearby, the Commission approved the construction
subject to the condition that the Nollans allow the public an easement to cross the portion of their property lying between the high
water mark and a sea wall approximately 10 feet inland. The Nollans unsuccessfully challenged this easement condition before the
Commission and the California courts, and then appealed to the
United States Supreme Court claiming that the condition violated
the federal Constitution's prohibition against taking private property
for public uses without just compensation.
The United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, reversed and held that the dedication amounted to a taking. Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, said that although the outright taking of an uncompensated, permanent, public access easement would
violate the takings clause, conditioning the Nollans' rebuilding permit on their granting such an easement would be a lawful land-use
regulation if it substantially furthered governmental purposes that
would justify denial of the permit. Justice Scalia reasoned that the
government's power to forbid particular land uses in order to advance some legitimate police-power purpose includes the power to
condition such use upon some concession by the owner, even a concession of property rights, so long as the condition furthers the same
governmental purpose advanced as justification for prohibiting the
use.
Citing Penn Central and Agins for the proposition that land-use
regulation (including a dedication condition) does not effect a taking
if it (1) substantially advances legitimate state interests and (2) does
not deny an owner economically viable use of his land, the Court
held that the condition imposed in this instance failed to further the
state interest advanced as the justification for the condition and,
therefore, was not a valid regulation of land use, but "an out-and-out

MONEY FOR THE TAKING

19881

plan of extortion." 4 4
The Court assumed (for the purpose of the decision) that protection of the public's ability to see the beach was a legitimate state
interest, but found nevertheless that because no "nexus" existed between the identified impact of the project (obstruction of the ocean
view) and the easement condition (physical access across the beach),
the exaction constituted a taking of private property without just
compensation. In this case, Justice Scalia wrote, the Commission's
imposition of the access-easement condition cannot be treated as an
exercise of land-use regulation power since the condition does not
serve the public purposes related to the permit requirement. None of
the Commission's claims (protecting the public's ability to see the
beach, assisting the public in overcoming a perceived "psychological
barrier" to using the beach, and preventing beach congestion) were
plausible. The Court held there was no connection or "nexus" between the condition imposed and the recognized burden created by
the new construction, rejecting the notion that a nexus existed between visual access and actual access sufficient to meet constitutional
requirements:
Thus, if the Commission attached to the permit some condition
that would have protected the public's ability to see the beach notwithstanding the construction of the new house - for example, a
height limitation, a width restriction, or a ban on fences - so long
as the Commission could have exercised its police power (as we
have assumed it could) to forbid construction of the house altogether, imposition of the condition would also be constitutional.
Moreover (and here we come close to the facts of the present case),
the condition would be constitutional even if it consisted of the requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their property for passersby with whose sighting of the ocean their new house
would interfere. Although such a requirement, constituting a permanent grant of continuous access to the property, would have to
be considered a taking if it were not attached to a development
permit, the Commission's assumed power to forbid construction of
the house in order to protect the public's view of the beach must
surely include the power to condition construction upon some concession by the owner, even a concession of property rights, that
serves the same end. If a prohibition designed to accomplish that
purpose would be a legitimate exercise of the police power rather
than a taking, it would be strange to conclude that providing the
44.

Id. at 3148.
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owner an alternative to that prohibition which accomplishes the
same purpose is not."

The Court stated that in this case the condition substituted for
the prohibition utterly failed to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition; the lack of nexus between the condition

and the original purpose of the building restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it was. The Court held that, un-

less the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as
the development ban, the building restriction was not a valid land
use regulation but "an out-and-out plan of extortion."
The Court further stated:
It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people
already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans'
property reduces any obstacles of viewing the beach created by the
new house. It is also impossible to understand how it lowers any
'psychological barrier' to using the public beaches, or how it helps
to remedy any additional congestion on them caused by construction of the Nollans' new house. We therefore find that the Commission's imposition of the permit condition cannot be treated as an
exercise of its land use power for any of these purposes. "
In summary, the United States Supreme Court through the
Nollan case has tightened the nexus or connection rule between the
dedication or fee condition and the burden being imposed. If there is
no such nexus or connection, the decision to impose the conditions
would not be a proper land-use decision and therefore could amount
to a taking of property for which money must be paid pursuant to
the protection of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution as recently affirmed in First Lutheran Church.
The Court appears to quite clearly reject the very broad indirect
nexus theory some California courts were following after the seminal
nexus decision of Associated Home Builders, Etc., Inc. v. City of
47
Walnut Creek.
45. Id. at 3147.
46. Id., at 3149.
47. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971) (wherein the court rejected a
direct nexus argument). See, especially, Whaler's Village Club v. California Coastal Com.,
173 Cal. App. 3d 240, 220 Cal. Rptr. 2 (1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1962 (1986) (dedication of a private beach as a condition to constructing a revetment to protect homes from wave
action); Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n., 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578
(1985) (dedication of two-thirds of an owner's property for lateral beach access as a condition
to building a beach home).
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However, whether or not the United States Supreme Court has
imposed a strict nexus is still left up in the air. Apart from holding
that the condition in question did not, for utter lack of the essential
nexus, survive constitutional scrutiny, the Court did not decide how
close the nexus must be for a regulation to "substantially advance" a
"legitimate state interest."
The Court did say that its previous cases made clear "that a
broad range of governmental purposes and regulations satisfied these
requirements. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, supra, at 260-262
(scenic zoning); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, supra
(landmark preservation); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (residential zoning) [sic]."18
The Nollan case does not say that the dedication requirement
may be upheld only if that particular subdivision creates the need for
the dedication, which was the argument earlier rejected by the California Supreme Court in Associated Homes Builders. 9 It would
appear that the law under Nollan is that the condition would be upheld if it substantially furthered a governmental purpose and the
condition furthered the same governmental purpose advanced for
regulating it. The Court did suggest that the constitutionally required nexus may be even tighter where exactions include the actual
conveyance of property, therefore indicating that mitigation fees
might not be subject to such a close scrutiny as would be an actual
conveyance of property. The Nollan decision did not discuss in any
fashion the nature, amount or size of an excessive dedication, and
thus again the Court failed to reach the question of "how far is too
far?"
D. Keystone Coal -

Pennsylvania Coal Revisited.

In Keystone Coal, the Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute that
coal mine operators leave a certain amount of coal in the ground to
prevent land subsidence. The Court held that the regulation was a
valid exercise of the police power and not a taking of property within
the meaning of the fifth amendment takings clause since the mine
operators had not sustained their heavy burden of showing that the
statute on its face effects a taking. The Court found that the record
showed that the state had acted to arrest what it perceived to be a
significant threat to the common welfare. Further, the record did not
48.
49.

Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3147.
4 Cal.3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971).
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support a finding that the statute made it impossible for the mine
operators to profitably engage in their business or unduly interfered
with their investment-backed expectations. The Court in Keystone
Coal also held that the coal left in the ground is not a separate segment of property for purposes of the takings clause and that the requirement that the coal be left in place did not effect a physical
taking.
IV.

IMPACTS OF THE NEW CASES ON LAND USE PLANNING

A.

General Impacts.

1. Chilling Effect.
While the extent of the "chill" is uncertain, it is certain that the
new takings cases - especially First Lutheran Church's monetary
damages remedy - will put some degree of chill on the land-use
regulation process. The California Supreme Court in Agins was trying to avoid just such a chill. In justifying its decision that damages
were not available for a regulatory taking, the court, quoting a commentator, warned that the utilization of the damages remedy:
would have a chilling effect on the exercise of police regulatory
powers at a local level, because the expenditure of funds would be,
to some extent, within the power of the judiciary. 'This threat of
unanticipated financial liability will intimidate legislative bodies
and will discourage the implementation of strict or innovative planning measures in favor of measures that are less stringent, more
traditional, and fiscally safe. ' 0
The majority in the First Lutheran Church acknowledged that
their decision would have such an effect "undoubtedly lessen to some
extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners and governing
bodies of municipal corporations when enacting land use
regulations."5' 1
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, felt that the damage
remedy was inappropriate because, among other reasons, of its chilling effect:
The policy implications of today's decision are obvious and, I
fear, far reaching. Cautious local officials and land-use planners
may avoid taking any action that might later be challenged and
50. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276, 598 P.2d 25, 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372,
377 (1979).
51. First Lutheran Church, 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
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thus give rise to a damage action. Much important regulation will
never be enacted ....

It is no answer to say that '[a]fter all, if a

policeman must know the constitution, then why not a planner?'
San Diego Gas and Electric Company v. San. Diego, 450 U.S. 621,
661, n. 26 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). To begin with, the
Court has repeatedly recognized that it itself cannot establish any
objective rules to assess when a regulation becomes a taking . . .
(citations omitted). How then can it demand that land planners do
any better? However confusing some of our criminal procedure
cases may be, I do not believe that they have been as open-ended
and standardless as our regulatory takings cases are. As one commentator concluded: 'The chaotic state of taking law makes it especially likely that availability of the damages remedy will induce
land-use planning officials to stay well back of the invisible line
that they dare not cross.' 52
Only time will tell the true extent of the "chill," but it seems
certain that, to some extent, city planning officials will be more cautious in rejecting development plans and in requiring certain types of
dedications and exactions. There also may be less innovation and
flexibility in the planning process as they stick to "fiscally safe"
land-use tools.
2.

Trend in the law of takings.

The First Lutheran Church and Nollan cases seem to indicate
the desire of the current majority of the Court to increase the protection of private property rights against excessive governmental regulation. But it remains unclear how far the majority intends to push
its agenda. In the three cases the Court cited with approval a variety
of land-use regulations. In Keystone Coal, the Court at least reaffirmed (and perhaps extended) existing law as to how far a regulation may go.
If these cases indicate a trend in the law of takings, it is possible
that the Court may change the standard for determining when regulation "goes too far." Also, with the possibility that cities might be
assessed monetary damages for regulatory excesses, one might hope
that the Court would at least better articulate the standard.
3. Applicability to initiatives and referenda.
Although the Court did not specifically address the issue, nothing in the First Lutheran Church and Nollan cases would make
52.

Id. at 2399.
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their decisions inapplicable to land-use regulations enacted through
initiatives or referenda. The California Supreme Court in Agins,
among its onslaught of reasons why damages should not be available,
cited another commentator's warning "[aire the voters, through the
initiative power, also to have this unwelcome power to inadvertently
commit funds from the public treasury? . . .The potential for fiscal
chaos would be great if this were the result." ' 3
In light of the fact that First Lutheran Church has overruled
Agins' remedy limitation, opponents of land use regulation initiatives
will almost certainly raise the spectre of damages in their campaigns.
In other words, since it is clear that voters have no greater rights
than a city council when enacting land use regulations, a voter-initiated measure could also amount to a compensable taking if it does
not meet the two-part test.54
4.

Retroactivity.

The holdings of the cases will probably be applied retroactively,
that is to say, damages would be available for regulations enacted
before First Lutheran Church. However, in many cases the applicable statute of limitations will bar any action.
B.
1.

Specific Impacts And Questions.

Temporary takings.

The Court in First Lutheran Church declared that damages
must be available for "temporary" takings of property. The temporary taking period encompasses the time between when the taking
first occurred and when the offending regulation is repealed. This
holding raises a number of questions.
a.

Delays.

One question is whether delays in the planning process could be
compensable. The First Lutheran Church majority indicated that
"normal" delays in obtaining building permits, changing zoning ordinances, variances and the like were "quite different questions." Presumably these delays and others, such as compliance with CEQA
(California Environmental Quality Act), will not be compensable,
but instead will be seen as a normal and acceptable result of the
53. Agins, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276, 598 P.2d 25, 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 377 (1979).
54. See Building Industry Assn. v. City of Camarillo, 41 Cal. 3d 810, 718 P.2d 68, 226
Cal. Rptr. 81 (1986).
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planning process. Normal delays apparently need not necessarily be
short, either. In Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n. v.
Hamilton Bank," the Court reviewed a subdivision map application
process which had spanned over eight years and nevertheless found
that the plaintiff had not presented a "ripe" taking claim.
In Guinnane v. City and County of San Francisco,' 1 the court,
after reviewing the principles laid down in Agins, supra, and First
Lutheran Church, supra, held that a year plus city study to consider
possible acquisition of property as a city park did not amount to a
taking. The court said that this delay was a normal one in the governmental decision-making process.
But what about delays which are not "normal"? Whether or not
abnormal delays will be compensable probably depends on the type
and length of delay and the ability of the owner to use his property
during the delay. Most unintentional delays probably will not be
compensable. Unintentional delays might include delays caused by
governmental errors-such as delays caused by the failure of a city
to follow the requirements, for example, of the General Plan laws or
CEQA for a project" or failure of a city to obey the limitations of
the Permit Streamlining Act, Governmental Code § 65920 et seq.,
resulting in litigation and further delay."' In cases where these delays are caused by good faith errors and the owner has some use of
his property, the delays should not be compensable. The developer's
claim against the city in these cases, if any, is really less in the nature of a takings claim and more in the nature of a negligence claim,
from which the city would have the protection of governmental tort
immunity. Moreover, the developer, in some cases, has the opportunity to at least try to prevent these mistakes from happening if they
occur during the processing of the application."
However, delays that prevent a developer from using his property at all because a city has failed to substantially follow the law
could result in claims for money damages. For example, if a court
has ordered a city to stop land-use processing during the period that
the city's general plan is undergoing review and correction and if, as
a consequence of this delay, the developer has no use of his property,
55. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
55.1 197 Cal. App. 3d 862, 241 Cal. Rpt. 787 (1987).
56. See San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society, Inc. v. County of San Bernardino, 155
Cal. App. 3d 738, 202 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1984).
57. See Palmer v. City of Ojai, 178 Cal. App. 3d 280, 223 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1986).
58. E.g., San Bernardino Valley Audubon.
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a court might find a temporary taking if the owner is damaged.
Intentional delays pose some tougher questions. Bad faith attempts to stall a project may well be compensable, if not as takings
then at least as violations of the developer's rights to due process of
law. Good faith intentional delays-such as interim ordinances, moratoria, and other such growth control measures-are somewhat different, however, as discussed below. Of course, these questions cannot be definitively answered until the California courts have had an
opportunity to rule on them.
b. Interim ordinances, moratoria and other growth control
measures.
Interim ordinances, moratoria, and other such growth control
measures should continue to be lawful exercises of the police power,
so long as they do not "go too far."
Interim ordinances pursuant to CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 65858
(West 1983) which prohibit new development plans so that a city
can reevaluate its land-use policies should continue to be lawful, provided the period of delay is reasonable and there are valid reasons
justifying the adoption of the interim ordinance. The length of delay
which is reasonable will probably vary from case to case, and courts
should recognize the fact that limited fiscal resources will necessarily
slow the planning process. Developers may wish (or be asked) to help
fund independent studies which otherwise would have to be delayed
for lack of resources. As a preventive measure, a city should consider
allowing some use during the interim period and not prohibit all uses
of the property.
Moratoria and other growth control measures which are based
on documented health and safety and general welfare concerns are
more likely to withstand constitutional challenges. In cases where the
perceived problems of development can be mitigated, those measures
which relax restrictions upon attainment of realistic service level
goals will be more likely to withstand attack. Also, properly documented growth control measures could withstand judicial scrutiny if
they allow enough potential for eventual development or other fruitful use so that owners are not denied economically viable use of their
property.
c.

Measurement issues.

(1) Measurement of damages.
The Court in First Lutheran Church, with reference to the issue
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of compensation for temporary takings, referred to three World War
II cases where the government had exercised its power of eminent
domain for a limited period of time.59 In these cases, compensation
was based on the value of a leasehold interest in the property taken.
Even assuming this is the appropriate measure of damages, it is not
clear how the rental value of the property should be determined. In
the regulatory taking context, it would rarely make any sense to calculate the rental value on the basis of the use in existence at the time
of the taking, because very often no use at all is being made of the
property. Should the use for which the rental value is determined be
the developer's planned use, or the "highest and best" use, if different? Or, since the developer is not necessarily entitled to use its
property according to its desires, should the use used for calculation
of the rental value be the most profitable use allowed under the most
restrictive possible lawful restriction? These questions will have to be
resolved in future litigation.
Perhaps rental value is not the appropriate measure of damages.
The Court occasionally makes reference to the owner's "investmentbacked expectations." Does this mean that the owner's damages
should be based somehow on the owner's investment or on some kind
of a return on that investment? This would tend toward the unlikely
result of favoring those owners who have overpaid (or at least paid
top dollar) for their property. Surely that cannot be the Court's intention. Indeed, there is an inherent ambiguity in the reference to
interference with "investment-backed expectations." On one hand,
the cases establish that even a substantial diminution in value due to
a downzoning does not alone constitute a taking," wherein the court
upheld the validity of a zoning ordinance that reduced the value of
private property by as much as 90 percent). On the other hand, such
a downzoning will almost surely frustrate the investment-backed expectations of any recent purchaser of the property and probably result in a loss on the investment.
The Court's reference to "investment-backed expectations"
probably is better interpreted as an admonishment. At some point in
the process where the city has granted a certain amount of entitlements which the owner has relied on to exercise an option on the
59. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v. Petty
Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373
(1945).
60. See William C. Haas Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117,
1120-21 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1979).
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property or has incurred further expenses, the city may be precluded
from taking an "about-face" direction at the direct expense of the
owner's investment-backed expectations. At the same time, developers should be aware that because there is no right to develop in California, whether a developer's "expectations" will be found to be reasonable will remain an open question.
Basing an owner's damages on lost profits would be no easy
task. In general, a plaintiff's damages must be susceptible of reasonable proof - they may not be speculative. Determining a developer's
profits lost by virtue of a temporary taking would necessarily involve
speculation as to the developer's cost and the feasibility and ultimate
success of the project. Courts may well decide that these matters are
too speculative to form the basis for an award of damages.
Another open question is whether consequential damages should
be allowed to a victim of a regulatory taking. What if the delay
causes the developer to lose a loan at a favorable interest rate, and
the rates subsequently increase substantially? Should the added interest the developer will have to pay be part of its damages? What if
the delay (including, perhaps, litigation over the regulation in controversy) causes the owner to be unable to carry the costs of the
project and to lose the land to foreclosure? If the owner is forced
into bankruptcy as a result of an unlawful delay, would the bankrupt's estate (or its creditors) have any claim against the city for
damages from the insolvency? Again, these are questions with which
future courts and commentators will wrestle.
(2) Measurement of the period of the temporary
taking-ripeness issue.
Another open question is how the period of the temporary taking will be measured. For one thing, it will be difficult to determine
when the period of the temporary taking commences, especially
given the Court's rulings in Williamson County, and MacDonald,
Sommer & Frates, which require the submission and resubmission of
development plans or the application for zoning amendments or variances before the taking claim will be "ripe."
In MacDonald, the Court held that a rejection of one development application, in that case, a subdivision map, did not constitute
a taking since the Court reasoned that the county had not reached a
final decision as to how the county's land use regulations would be
applied and therefore the Court could not determine whether a taking had occurred.
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In Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz,"1 the property owner's claim of
taking was dismissed by the federal appellate court because there
had been no attempts to secure a development permit prior to bringing suit. Relying on Williamson County, supra, the Ninth Circuit
court ruled that an inverse condemnation cause of action is not ripe
until the landowner has secured a "final decision" on a permit application and on a request for a variance. This prerequisite could be
waived only upon a showing that such requests would be "futile."
Kinzli, citing Norco Construction, Inc. v. King County", held that
futility involves the showing that it is "'clear beyond peradventure
that excessive delay in such a final determination [would cause] the
present destruction of the property's beneficial use.' "" The Kinzli
court suggested another test for futility, citing American Savings &
Loan Association v. Marin County", "'the submission of a plan for
development is futile if a sufficient number of prior applications have
been rejected by the planning authority.' 6
Of course, the ending of the period of the temporary taking
should be more clear - it should be the date the unlawful restriction
is lifted.
2.

Effect of the "nexus" requirement on specific land use tools.

Whether Nollan's "nexus" requirement will have much of an
effect on most land use measures is questionable. The "nexus" requirement that the condition imposed relate to the burden created by
the development will probably have little application outside of the
setting of development conditions and exactions. Planning and zoning changes, preservation of open space, landmarks, and natural conditions such as coastal areas, wetlands, floodplains and hillsides
should be considered on their own merits.
Many commonplace conditions such as the dedication of streets,
curbs and gutters, sewers, parks and open space - where the dedication mitigates the recognized impact of that development on
streets, sewers, parks, etc. - will have the necessary nexus and will
survive. Other conditions, including exactions for public art, child
day care and some in-lieu fees, may now be of doubtful validity if
the city could not justify denying the development on those grounds.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

818 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1987).
801 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1986).
Kinzli, 818 F.2d at 1454 (citations omitted).
653 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1981).
Id.
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No doubt cities will make every effort to meet the Nollan nexus requirement in an effort to preserve such conditions.
C. Impacts On Development And Litigation Strategies.
1. Development strategies.
Developers will feel that they are now in a better bargaining
position with the city, and they can be expected to flex their newfound muscles with warnings about potential damages liability and
concerns for "nexus." But in light of the Williamson County, MacDonald and Kinzli cases, developers will have to have the patience to
submit and resubmit development plans and to apply for plan and
zoning amendments or variances to avoid "ripeness" problems.
Cities will have to ensure that the delays they impose are normal or, if abnormal, justifiable. Cities may be well advised to never
prohibit all use of property for any substantial length of time; instead they should leave some economically viable use of the property,
even if that use is one to which the developer might realistically
never put the property. Cities should carefully identify local
problems, establish regulations and development conditions with a
logical nexus to those problems identified, and should be careful to
create a good administrative record to support their actions. Cities
should also, as before, be careful to follow proper procedures and to
respect "vested rights."
2. Litigation strategies.
Whether litigation strategies will change drastically is questionable. Of course, with the availability of damages, all plaintiffs can be
expected to seek them. Since the takings meter will be ticking during
the pendency of the litigation, cities should now avoid unnecessary
delays and dilatory tactics, including unimportant procedural
appeals.
V.

CONCLUSION

As can be seen from the discussion above, the courts, especially
the United States Supreme Court, have not laid down any litmus
test or any one set rule by which to measure when a land-use regulation "goes too far." The First Lutheran Church and Nollan cases
make it quite clear that, first, if a land-use regulation goes so far as
to amount to a taking, the fifth amendment demands compensation,
not invalidation, and, second, that there must be a nexus between a
condition and the approval of a development. If there is no nexus,
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the condition amounts to a taking.
In the future, city officials, in exercising their police power in
land-use regulations and issuing land-use decisions, must clearly
practice preventive law in light of the above principles.

